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DAS WICHTIGSTE IN KÜRZE
Es ist seit langem unbestritten, dass der erfolgreiche Einsatz von Prozesstech-
nologien entscheidend von der organisatorischen Infrastruktur von Unternehmen
abhängt. Ebenso ist bekannt, dass die Implementierung neuer Technologien im
Produktionsprozess oft des organisatorischen Wandels bedarf, um diese Techno-
logien optimal nutzen zu können. Der Forschungszweig, der sich mit Umwelt-
technologien und deren Wirkung auf die Produktivität oder Wettbewerbsfähigkeit
von Unternehmen befasst, hat diesen Aspekt allerdings bislang fast völlig außer
Acht gelassen. Der folgende Beitrag nimmt sich dieser Forschungslücke an und
nutzt hierzu Daten des Mannheimer Innovationspanels (CIS 2008). Die zentrale
Forschungsfrage unseres Beitrages ist dabei, ob Unternehmen, die eine Technolo-
gie zur Vermeidung von Treibhausgasemissionen (CO2) in ihren Produktionspro-
zess eingeführt haben, diese Technologie erfolgreicher, d.h. produktiver einsetzen
können, wenn sie gleichzeitig organisatorische Innovationen eingeführt haben.
Letzteres umfasst Änderungen in der Ablauforganisation von Prozessen im Un-
ternehmen, Änderungen in der Aufbauorganisation, aber auch neue Formen der
Organisation von Beziehungen zu externen Partnern.
In unserer Analyse modellieren wir die Produktionsfunktion der Unternehmen
indem wir eine Cobb-Douglas Produktionsfunktion um endogene Entscheidungs-
variablen, nämlich über den Einsatz von CO2 Vermeidungstechnologien und/oder
organisatorischen Innovationen, erweitern. Vereinfacht ausgedrückt untersuchen
wir, ob Unternehmen, die CO2 Vermeidungstechnologien zusammen mit organisa-
torischen Innovationen im Produktionsprozess implementiert haben, produktiver
sind, d.h. mehr Umsatz mit Hilfe des gleichen Einsatzes von Produktionsfaktoren
generieren können, als andere Unternehmen. Wir tragen der potentiellen Endo-
genität der Entscheidungsvariablen Rechnung, indem wir Instrumentenvariablen
für die endogenen Entscheidungsvariablen konstruieren. Hierfür nutzen wir ein
diskretes Entscheidungsmodell, dass verschiedene Determinanten der Entschei-
dung Vermeidungstechnologien oder organisatorische Innovationen einzuführen
beinhaltet. Außerdem berücksichtigt dieses simultane Gleichungsmodell, dass die
Einführung einer der beiden Technologien nicht unabhängig von der Einfürung
der anderen ist.
Als zentrales Ergebnis der ökonometrischen Analyse zeigt sich einerseits, dass
Unternehmen, die Treibhausgasvermeidungstechnologien eingeführt haben, oh-
ne dabei ihre organisatorische Infrastruktur anzupassen, als Folge eine niedrige-
re Produktivität haben als Unternehmen der Kontrollgruppe, d.h. Unternehmen
die weder Vermeidungstechnologien noch organisatorische Innovationen einge-
führt haben. Auf der anderen Seite erreichen Unternehmen, die zusätzlich zum
Einsatz von Vermeidungstechnologien organisatorische Innovationen eingeführt
haben, eine höhere Produktivität als die Kontrollgruppe. Mit anderen Worten, Ver-
meidungstechnologien und organisatorische Innovationen sind komplementär in
Bezug auf die Produktivität von Unternehmen. Diese Ergebnisse haben Implikatio-
nen für die nachhaltige und wirtschaftliche Einführung von Umwelttechnologien
in Unternehmen. Eine Anpassung der Unternehmens- oder Prozessorganisation ist
demnach entscheidend für den effizienten Einsatz neuer CO2 Vermeidungstechno-
logien und deren Vereinbarkeit mit der Wirtschaftlichkeit von Unternehmen.
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
That the successful use of process technology crucially depends on the right
organisational infrastructure is known for a long time as well as the fact that the
adoption of new process technology may need organisational change to be used
in an efficient way. The strand of the literature dealing with productivity or com-
petitiveness effects of environmental technology adoption, however, has largely
neglected these aspects. Using data from the German part of the Community In-
novation Survey (CIS 2008), this study aims at closing this gap in the literature.
The central research question is whether firms that introduced greenhouse gas
abatement technologies (CO2) into their production process can make more effi-
cient use of such technology if it is introduced jointly with organisational change.
The latter covers the introduction of new methods of process organisation, the in-
troduction of new forms of work management, and new methods of dealing with
external relations.
As to bring this question to an empirical test, we model firms’ production
function by relying on a standard Cobb-Douglas functional form augmented by
firms’ endogenous decision variables concerning the introduction of CO2 abate-
ment technologies (henceforth green innovations) and/or organizational change.
In brief, we test whether firms that jointly adopted green and organisational in-
novations achieve higher productivity (i.e. produce more outputs with the same
amounts of inputs) compared to other firms. As to take the endogeneity of the
choice variables into account, we use the predicted probabilities from a discrete
choice model as instruments for the endogenous innovation adoption variables in
the production function approach. The discrete choice models include several de-
terminants of the decision to introduce green or organisational innovations and
furthermore accounts for the fact that both adoption decisions are not indepen-
dently determined. Thus, both discrete choices are estimated jointly in a bivari-
ate probit regression that provides predicted probabilities for any combination of
green and organisational innovation adoption (i.e. neither of them, green only,
organisational only, or both).
The empirical analysis provides strong and robust evidence for complemen-
tarity of green and organisational innovations with respect to firms’ productivity.
On the one hand, we find that firms which introduced green technology without
organisational change to have lower productivity compared to the control group,
i.e. firms that introduced neither green nor organisational innovations. On the
other hand, firms that introduced both types of innovations jointly enjoy a higher
productivity compared to the control group. These results have important im-
plications for the economically advantageous and sustainable introduction of en-
vironmental technology in the business sector. Changes in firms’ organisational
structure appear crucial for using new CO2 abatement technologies in more effi-
cient ways facilitating comparability of commercial and environmental goals.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The literature on internal firm-organization has emphasized the importance
of organizational structures for efficient technology use. Caroli and Van Reenen
(2001, p. 1450) make this point more explicitly by saying that "Without the orga-
nizational and skill infrastructure, technology alone is not enough." This relation-
ship has become known as the so called "productivity paradox". Studies dealing
with environmental technology, however, have largely ignored this stream of lit-
erature. This research has mainly focused on the role governmental regulation
plays for abatement technology adoption and its consequences for firms’ produc-
tivity and competitiveness. What this literature has not touched is the question of
how abatement technologies integrate into the firms production process and what
factors determine its efficient adoption.
Only very recently, Bloom, Genakos, Martin and Sadun (2010) find that better
managed firms have lower energy intensities and that advanced environmental
management is significantly associated with higher productivity. A further study
by Martin, Muûls, de Preux and Wagner (2012) also offers evidence in favor of
this view. However, both studies do not allow to conclude that environmental
management improves the marginal returns to environmental technology adop-
tion meaning that both have complementary effects on productivity.
In this paper, we extent these approaches by adopting a more general view.
In particular, we study whether organizational change can help firms to make
more efficient use from greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation (henceforth “green”)
technologies. This question has received little attention so far although it de-
serves even more attention if abatement technology provides high environmental
and social returns, but less obvious private benefits. If having to introduce CO2
mitigation technologies would hurt firm’s private returns, then any complemen-
tary effect from introducing organizational change that moves private returns into
positive territory, would be good news for the diffusion of green technologies. To
understand the underlying mechanisms through which green technology use—
especially if introduced to cope with governmental regulation—interacts with the
firms’ organization of production processes will be important to understand the
impact of green technologies on competitiveness. For this purpose, we draw from
the literature dealing with organizational change and technology complementar-
ity.
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) provide the theoretical foundation used in later
empirical research. Subsequent research—especially dealing with the case of in-
formation technology (IT) adoption—provides a considerable body of empirical
evidence showing that adequate organizational structures complement technol-
ogy use and thus allow firms to achieve larger productivity returns from tech-
nology adoption. For instance, Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) identify
complementarity effects between organizational change and information technol-
ogy use and product innovation. Most recently Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen
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(2012), provide empirical evidence that United States’ (US) multinational enter-
prizes located in the United Kingdom (UK) have higher returns from IT use com-
pared to UK domestic firms. The explanation of this phenomenon is that US firms’
internal organization allows to make better use of IT, or in other words, the or-
ganizational form US firms have adopted is complementary to IT use. Another
piece of empirical evidence for complementarity between organizational change
and technology use can be found in Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997). They
find that the use of individual human resource practices complements the use of
human resource management system technologies in steel producing plants, i.e.
joint adoption is identified to increase steel finishing lines’ productivity. We adopt
an empirical approach in line with this literature, however, focusing on produc-
tivity effects of green technology adoption. We develop an empirical framework
exploring whether green technologies jointly adopted with changes in firms’ orga-
nizational structure allow to make better use of these technologies. Complemen-
tarity between both strategies may more than offset productivity losses of adopting
green technology alone.
The following section will illustrate how our contribution fits into the literature
dealing with environmental technology adoption and firm performance. Section
III. starts with a brief introduction to estimating complementarity followed by
our estimation strategy. Section IV. describes the German Community Innovation
Survey (CIS) data from the 2009 wave that will be used for the empirical analysis.
Results will be discussed in section V. before section VI. concludes.
II. ABATEMENT TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
Within the last few decades, the effects of environmental technology adoption
on firms’ competitiveness was a frequently—and at times hotly—debated topic in
economic research that has created a considerable body of empirical evidence at
the firm-level. However, previous studies focused rather on the role governmental
regulation plays for firm performance and for productivity effects of abatement
technologies it has stimulated. In this sense, regulation is central since it has been
identified as a key driver for environmental technology invention and adoption1.
1For a recent survey of the impact of regulation on the adoption of environmental technolo-
gies, see Popp, Newell and Jaffe (2010). For the early literature, the reader is referred to the
review of Jaffe, Newell and Stavins (2002). However, the literature deals rather with inventions
than with innovation adoption. A very recent study by Johnstone, Hascic and Popp (2010) finds
positive evidence for regulation-induced green innovations. They go as far as saying that "In gen-
eral, policy, rather than prices, appears to be the main driver of innovation in these technologies"
(Johnstone et al. 2010, p. 146). However, the study of Snyder, Miller and Stavins (2003) finds
no significant evidence for regulation to be a driver of technology adoption in the chlorine man-
ufacturing industry. Another study by Kerr and Newell (2003) provides empirical evidence that
market-based regulation offers greater incentives to adopt environmental technology than stan-
dard command-and-control regulation. Horbach (2008) provides further evidence from German
innovation panel data regarding the drivers of environmental innovations. Using firm-level data
from Italy, Antonioli, Mancinelli and Mazzanti (2011) find that human resource management and
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An important strand of literature estimates the impact of a specific measure of
the regulatory stringency on firm- or sector productivity. This literature emerged in
the beginning of the 1980s after the US and other highly industrialized countries
introduced regulations of local water and air pollutants (like SO2). This literature
typically uses data from the US Pollution Abatement Costs Expenditure (PACE)
survey to measure regulation. Abatement costs reject both regulatory stringency
and the amount of otherwise productive factors allocated to pollution abatement
(like capital or labor) to meet regulatory requirements. Inputs allocated to abate-
ment, especially capital goods, embody, of course, an abatement technology or to
use this papers wording, green innovations.
As one of the first using the PACE survey data, Gray (1987) reports a nega-
tive correlation of pollution abatement operating costs (PAOC) with total factor
productivity (TFP) at the sectoral level indicating no productive use of abate-
ment technology. The study of Gray and Shadbegian (2003) provides estimates
for PAOC’s impact on both TFP and output in a production function estimation
(similar to our approach). Their results based on observations for pulp and paper
mills do not suggest a productive use of abatement inputs. Conversely, Shadbe-
gian and Gray (2005) find that abatement capital inputs of pulp and paper mills
significantly contribute to the production of desired outputs. However, they do not
observe such effects for steel mills and oil refineries. For the latter, the study of
Berman and Bui (2001) provides evidence in support of regulation induced abate-
ment investment’s positive contribution to productivity growth. They find that
there was a “substantial” investment into pollution abatement capital by refineries
in a region that has been strongly regulated compared to the whole US. In this
region, oil refineries’ productivity growth is reported to be on average five per-
centage points higher than the national average of refineries’s productivity growth
(which was negative in this period) in a ten year period. In other words, Berman
and Bui (2001) do not find support for productivity decreasing effects of pollution
abatement investments. Boyd and McClelland (1999) construct measures of inef-
ficiencies in paper mills’ production process using standard inputs and investment
in pollution abatement equipment (also reported in PACE) to reduce pollution.
They find that there is a potential for both input and pollution reduction between
two and eight percent to produce the same output, or put it another way, there
is a potential to increase output and decrease pollution by investing in abatement
technologies. However, the authors weaken this statement by saying that abate-
ment capital investment comes at the expense of otherwise productive investments
and therefore may lower overall productivity.
Productivity effects of greenhouse gas mitigation technology, however, remains
largely untouched by empirical research. Recently, Commins, Lyons, Schiffbauer
and Toll (2011) find that energy taxes as well as the European Emission Trading
Scheme (EU-ETS) have negative impacts on total factor productivity. This study,
workplace practices determine firms’ decisions to adopt CO2 abatement technologies.
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however, does not relate productivity consequences of climate policy directly to its
fundamental sources in the organization of production processes, namely adoption
of abatement technology adoption and its interrelations with other endogenous
firm-strategies.
In line with the literature dealing with IT (Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) and
Bresnahan et al. (2002)), we argue that firms can increase the productivity im-
pacts of GHG abatement technology if complementary organizational structures
are adopted. We therefore show that one has to consider firms’ internal behav-
ior as to reach conclusions on productivity effects of green technology. Our ap-
proach differs from Bloom et al. (2010) and Martin et al. (2012) also in the way
we measure green technology. We understand green technology adoption as any
technology that reduces CO2 emissions. On the one hand, CO2 reduction can be
achieved by using fossil-fuel inputs more efficiently and is therefore also related to
energy-efficiency that may positively affect total productivity. On the other hand,
improving the efficiency of fossil fuel use requires to install new capital goods
that use fossil fuels at a necessary minimum that is smaller than the levels of cur-
rently operated capital. Thus, if fossil fuel inputs and capital are used in rather
fixed proportions, increasing efficiency implies to replace old capital2 and thus to
lower productivity due to higher capital compensation. In general, the total ex-
ante expected effect of abatement technology adoption on productivity remains
ambiguous.
III. ESTIMATING COMPLEMENTARITY IN FIRM STRATEGIES
In this section, we review the literature on how complementarity between dif-
ferent types of economic activities can be accounted for. Complementarity be-
tween any two economic activities x and x′ means that doing more of one increases
the marginal benefits of doing more of the other. Special attention to measuring
complementarity is required when the economic activities are not of continuous
nature like, for instance, internal and external R&D. Athey and Stern (1998) offer
an overview on the methodologies used to test for complementarities and point
out difficulties in estimation when the adoption variables are dichotomous. The
following section will briefly describe the relevance of the measuring issues with
respect to the discrete firm strategies, green innovation and organizational change,
to be studied in our analysis.
2Atkeson and Kehoe (1999) for instance show that capital is rather putty-clay meaning in the
case of energy use that capital is operated using a rather fixed necessary minimum of energy inputs
so that an increase in energy efficiency is only possible in the long run via replacement of capital
goods.
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III.A How to Test for Complementarities?
There are, in principle, two ways to test for complementarity between firm
strategies. The first one is the adoption approach. In this approach, a significant
positive correlation between the adoption of two activities, conditioning on any
other factors, is an indicator of complementarity (Arora and Gambardella 1990,
Arora 1996). However, this approach is limited in its validity when x and x′ are not
continuously measurable. Thus, estimating a bivariate limited binary choice model
and treating the correlation between the two equations as an indicator of comple-
mentarity can be criticized because of incoherence problems. More precisely, such
an approach fails to separate complementarity from correlation due to unobserved
common other determinants among x and x′ (Miravete and Pernías 2010). The
second avenue to test for complementarity is the productivity approach which can
be modified for the case of binary activity variables.3
The productivity approach accounts for the effects of x and x′ on an perfor-
mance indicator, e.g. productivity. If, for instance, the performance indicator is
smooth and a twice differentiable function (say f) of the arguments x and x′ that
are smooth as well, a positive mixed partial derivative of the objective function
with respect to the two variables (∂2f/∂x∂x′) indicates complementarity of the
objective function’s two arguments because increasing the value of one activity
increases the returns of doing more of the other. The concept of supermodularity
is directly related to complementarity (Milgrom and Roberts 1990). Endogenous
firm technology adoption decisions, in case whether to adopt green innovation or
organizational change are a discrete choice. But as long as the set of combinations
of choice variables is defined over a sublattice (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, 1995),
the concept of supermodularity also works for binary arguments.
The condition saying that increasing the value of one activity increasing the
marginal return of the other reads in the binary case as adopting one strategy
increases the returns to the other strategy that is already adopted. Moreover,
adopting both jointly leads to a higher performance than adopting both in isola-
tion, simply because the one increases the marginal returns of the other. In this
3Another approach that is pursued at times is one that Athey and Stern (1998) label the “ran-
dom practise mode”, which is roughly speaking a mix of adoption and productivity approach. It
is used if the adoption variables are binary and potentially correlated and if no data on an out-
come variable is available. Miravete and Pernías (2006) use binary dummy variables and estimate
multi-equation discrete choice models with error components for each strategies’ unobservable
returns and control for unobserved correlation among the different adoption equations. Similar
approaches are used in Kretschmer, Miravete and Pernías (2012), Arora, Forman and Yoon (2010),
and Gentzkow (2007).
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sense, the condition for supermodularity and complementarity reads as follows:4
f(x) + f(x′) ≤ f(x ∨ x′) + f(x ∧ x′), or: (1)
f(1, 0) + f(0, 1) ≤ f(1, 1) + f(0, 0), (2)
In the following, we are interested in how this condition—of course for the case of
green technology adoption and organizational change—can be adequately tested
for.
III.B Empirical Framework and Estimation Strategy
We now turn to the estimation of the impact of green innovation on firm per-
formance and whether organizational change can help making better use of green
technology. If both green innovation and organizational change contribute to bet-
ter firm performance, we would expect the productivity increase to be even higher
if both forms of innovations had been adopted compared to the case in which
either green or organizational innovations would have been independently intro-
duced. Although complementarity, as defined by inequality 1 is perfectly symmet-
ric in the two strategies, we are particularly interested whether the adoption of
organizational changes improves the marginal returns of introducing green tech-
nologies. Particularly, when green innovations alone would decrease firm’s pro-
ductivity, we are interested to see whether additionally introduced organizational
change may at least (partially) offset green technology’s negative productivity ef-
fects. This could hold because such a combined green change event would result
in better performing business processes, worker relationships and/or customer or
supplier relationships, mitigating any negative productivity effects from having to
introduce green technology in isolation.
For the purpose of testing these relationships on our data, we employ the stan-
dard procedure to test for difference in firm-level productivity, as for instance
used by Gray and Shadbegian (2003) and Shadbegian and Gray (2005) to esti-
mate pollution abatement capital investment’s impact on productivity. Let Y =
A · f(K,L,E,M) be firms’ output depending on capital (K), labor (L), energy
(E), and material (M) inputs, where Y → R+. Firms that only differ in (total
factor) productivity A but use the same amounts of other inputs may differ in the
amount of output produced. Green technology adoption, however, means that
some of otherwise productive capital inputs are allocated to pollution abatement.
Since the technology choices are defined over the sublattice {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1),
(1, 1)}, with f : {0, 1}2 → R+, we can test whether organizational change comple-
ments the use green technology and—in the end—improves its effects on produc-
tivity by testing whether f is supermodular in its arguments. Supermodularity is
4See Milgrom and Roberts (1990) for a proof and further details as well as Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1994).
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present if the following condition applies:
f(1, 0|K,L,E,M) + f(0, 1|K,L,E,M)
≤ f(0, 0|K,L,E,M) + f(1, 1|K,L,E,M). (3)
This condition says that if green technology adoption and organizational change
are complements, we would observe the productivity returns of joint adoption of
both innovations to be larger than the sum of the adoption of either green technol-
ogy or organizational change alone. Assuming a simple production function of the
Cobb-Douglas type, productivity (A) is the sum of the residual εi for observation i
and the constant term of a regression of logged output on logged inputs, known as
the Solow residual (Solow 1957). Thus, productivity is like a "neutral shifter" that
increases output holding total input requirements constant (see Syverson (2011)
for an overview on the literature on estimating productivity). Of course, we are in-
terested in the productivity consequences of green technology and organizational
change and therefore separate these effects from the error term. The resulting
estimation equation reads as follows:
yi = β0 + βkki + βlli + βememi
+β10GREEN_ONLYi + β01ORGA_ONLYi + β11BOTHi
+β′cC + εi, (4)
where lower case letters indicate logarithms. As later discussed in the data sec-
tion, we have only information on the intermediate inputs as an aggregate, so
that emi measures logged material and energy inputs. The term NEITHERi is
linearly dependent on the other three adoption combinations (GREEN_ ONLY ,
ORGA_ONLY , BOTH) and thus offers no further information. In other words,
f(0, 0|K,L,EM,C) = 0. Any further fixed control variables are included in the
vector C.
In the productivity approach framework to test for complementarity, we are not
in a situation as Mohnen and Röller (2005) where the assumed complementary
variables are exogenous to the firms. Instead, firm’s decision to adopt green and
organizational innovations are endogenous strategy variables. As the error term
(plus the constant)—the Solow residual—is likely to reflect productivity, and as
the use of abatement technology is likely to affect productivity, as the literature
survey in section II. has shown, cov(GREEN_ONLY, ε) 6= 0 and cov(BOTH, ε) 6=
0, or in other words, our measures of green technology adoption are endogenous.
Organizational change is endogenous too5. Moreover, green technology adoption
and organizational change are expected not to be independent of each other. If
for instance organizational change really improves green technology’s productivity
and clever managers are aware of this fact, both types of technology adoption
5See test for endogeneity of these variables below.
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would be highly correlated. Unfortunately, managers’ abilities are unobservable in
our data.
As to take this endogeneity6 into account, the output equation (equation 4) is
estimated using the two-stage least squares instrumental variable estimator. What
makes things complex is that the endogenous regressors are binary indicators for
any of the innovation adoption combinations (GREEN_ONLY , ORGA_ONLY ,
and BOTH). To cope with this problem, Wooldridge (2002, p. 623) suggests to
estimate binary response models for the endogenous dummies including a vector
of instruments (Z) and any other variable from equation 4 (denoted by the vector
D). The predicted probabilities from the binary response models can be used as
instruments in the two-stage least squares estimation.
We therefore explicitly model a firm’s discrete choice to adopt green technology
labeled asXgr and organizational change (hereinafterXor). The dummyXgr takes
the value one if green technology is adopted, irrespectively whether organizational
change is adopted or not, representing the aforementioned cases x and x ∧ x′. As
said, we expect the decisions to adopt green technology and organizational change
not to be independent. A bivariate response model allows both adoption decisions
to depend on each other, where the decision to adopt organizational change (Xor)
is measured in a same similar fashion as green technology. The bivariate discrete
response model read as follows:
Xgri = α
gr
0 + β
′grZgri + γ
′grDgri + ε
gr
i (5)
Xori = α
or
0 + β
′orZori + γ
′orDori + ε
or
i ,where (6)[
εgr
εor
]
∼ N
(
0,
[
σ2gr σgr,or
σgr,or σ
2
or
])
(7)
Any other unobservable factors (εgr and εor) determining adoption choices are as-
sumed to be distributed jointly normally and are allowed to be correlated among
the equations. The instruments included in the vector (Z) are discussed at length
in the following section. The bivariate probit model has in addition the nice fea-
ture that it can report the conditional adoption probabilities for each of the four
6To see that the innovation decision variables (GREEN_ONLY , ORGA_ONLY , and
BOTH) are really endogenous, a regression-based test is carried out. Wooldridge (2002) ar-
gues in favor of this test that was introduced by Hausman (1978) and Hausman (1983). The
test requires to regress the endogenous variables on their instruments (Prob(Xgr =1, Xor = 0),
Prob(Xgr =0, Xor = 1), and Prob(Xgr =1, Xor = 1), which are discussed in the following) and to
use the residuals from this regressions as regressors in the structural equation. If the residuals are
significantly different from zero, endogeneity of the innovation adoption variables is presented,
which is the case in our model. The three residuals from the regressions of GREEN_ONLY ,
ORGA_ONLY , and BOTH on the instruments are all significantly different from zero at the 95
percent confidence level in the structural model (equation 4).
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possible adoption decision combinations,
Prob(Xgr = 0, Xor = 0) = Prob(x ∧ x′) (8)
Prob(Xgr = 1, Xor = 0) = Prob(x) (9)
Prob(Xgr = 0, Xor = 1) = Prob(x′) (10)
Prob(Xgr = 1, Xor = 1) = Prob(x ∨ x′) (11)
that are needed to test for complementarity of the two innovation adoption choices.
Of course, for every firm the predicted probabilities for all four cases necessarily
sum up to unity. These predicted choice probabilities—that are conditioned on
factors determining adoption and the covariance of the two equations’ errors—
are used as the instruments to for endogenous adoption decision combinations
(GREEN_ONLY , ORGA_ONLY , and BOTH) in the output (or productivity)
equation (see equation 4).
IV. DATA AND CHOICE OF INSTRUMENTS
The German part of the European-wide Community Innovation Survey (CIS)
provides the data for our analysis. We draw from the wave collected in 2009
which refers to the period 2006-2008.7 The 2009 cross-section offers information
on firm-level green technology adoption and organizational innovation in addi-
tion to a number of other innovation-related and more general firm characteris-
tics. The target population covers all firms with at least five employees in the
German business sector. The German CIS data appears to be particularly suitable
to our study since Germany is one of the world’s leading inventors, producers
and exporters of green technology and has at the same time a long and persis-
tent tradition of environmental regulations. In this sense, the 2009 cross-section
provides a unique set of variables that account for the adoption of environmental
technology and organization change also including factors that affect the respec-
tive technology adoption to construct control variables. We supplement the survey
data with information on patent applications of firms in our sample filed at the Eu-
ropean Patent Office (EPO) in the period 1978-2009 in order to construct a control
measure for the firm technology stock. Moreover, sectoral market concentration
measures are merged with the firm-level data at firms’ sector affiliation at the
NACE (Nomenclature statistique des Activités économiques dans la Communauté
Européenne) 3-digit level. This data comes from the German Monopoly Commis-
sion. The present study focuses on information of 3,896 firms’ observations after
the deletion of observations from the original data-set due to item non-response
7The survey is conducted annually by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), infas
Institut fuer Sozialforschung and ISI Fraunhofer Institute on behalf of the German Federal Ministry
of Education and Research. A detailed description of the survey data and the sampling method can
be found in the background reports available at ZEW.
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or outlier correction.8
IV.A Constructing Instruments: A Discrete Response Model of Innovation Choices
As described in the previous section, in the first stage of our econometric ap-
proach we estimate a bivariate probit model on the likelihood for introducing
green and organizational innovations. Thus, the dependent variables at this stage
are the adoption decisions obtained from the survey for green and organizational
innovations.
Green innovation adoption is defined as the firms’ carbon dioxide abatement
technology adoption. The German CIS questionnaire measures this variable in an
ordinal scale from innovation adoption with no, low, medium, and large effects
on CO2 mitigation. In the following, the green innovation dummy takes the value
one if at least innovation with a small impact on CO2 reduction had been achieved
and takes the value zero otherwise9.
Organizational change comprises a variety of activities in our study. These can
be categorized in three areas. First, the introduction of new methods of process or-
ganization such as quality management, supply chain management, lean produc-
tion, and knowledge management. Second, the introduction of new forms of work
management including decentralization, job rotation, teamwork, and the struc-
ture of teams and departments. Third, we consider activities like new methods
of dealing with external relations, the engagement in alliances and cooperations
with other firms, customers or suppliers as well as marketing innovations as forms
of organizational change. If firms introduced at least one of these three forms of
organizational change, we set our variable indicating organization change to one
and to zero otherwise. This results in two binary response variables (Xgr,Xor) to
be used as dependent variables in the bivariate probit estimation of green and or-
ganizational innovation adoption on several controls. This model then yields the
predicted probabilities for every combination {(1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0), (1, 1)} of these
two variables. These predicted values are subsequently used as instruments in the
productivity equation.
We assume the conditional predicted probabilities for green innovation and or-
ganizational change to depend on a number of factors that determine the decision
to adopt one or the other.
For environmental technology adoption the literature has identified govern-
mental regulation as a key driver. We therefore construct a dummy variable
(REG) that takes the value one if the firm indicated in the survey that environ-
8The sample distribution across industries is presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
9Regarding the definition of the green innovation dummy, sensitivity analyses are performed.
A more strict definition, meaning that the dummy takes the value of one if the environmental
impact is at least medium, leaves estimation coefficients and statistically significance rather un-
changed. If, however, the dummy takes the value of one only in cases when firms reported a high
environmental impact, the results change in a way that complementarity becomes even stronger
and green innovation introduced alone has an even more negative impact on productivity.
10
mental regulation (including taxes) had induced the introduction of some form of
innovation with beneficial effects for environment. This variable is also included
in the organizational innovation equation as environmental regulations may not
only trigger green innovations, but also induce firms to adapt their organizational
structures. If there are no direct effects from environmental regulation on orga-
nizational innovation adoption to be expected, i.e. it operates like an exclusion
restriction, finding a significant positive effect could be interpreted as positive ev-
idence for complementarity, see Athey and Stern (1998).
Besides regulation, firm-level characteristics may have a decisive impact on
whether or not a certain type of innovation is being introduced. Capital-intensive
production may use more energy inputs and thus emit more pollutants. In the
presence of regulation or relatively expensive energy inputs, firms operating more
capital could be more likely to adopt environmental technology. We therefore con-
trol for logged capital inputs (log_CAP ). The same applies to firms with higher
energy- and material inputs (log_ENMAT ). Additionally, larger firms may be
more likely to innovate. Hence, we also control for firm size by including the
logged number of employees (log_LAB). Moreover, we want to account for the
firm’s age (AGE) as their age may affect the propensity to innovate. We fur-
ther control for competitive forces using firms’ binary response to the question
whether they perceived competition to be hard or not (HARDCOMP ) as well as
the Herfindahl-Index of sales concentration (HHI) as a more objective measure
of industry concentration. On the one hand, firms could be expected to refrain
from introducing green technology in the presence of hard competition, in order
not to risk productivity losses that reduce their competitiveness. On the other
hand, competitive pressure may force firms to gain a competitive edge by being
innovative. Thus, firms may see a need to implement organizational change to
better exploit existing production technologies. In line with this paper’s central
hypothesis, the latter effect may also induce green technology, so that we expect
competitive pressure to influence both technology choices in the same direction.
From the labor and firm organization literature we derive important deter-
minants for the adoption of technological and organizational change alike. Car-
oli and Van Reenen (2001) point to the fact that organizational change needs
particularly skilled labor as to cope with more complex structures in the work
flow. We address this by including two different variables: The share of grad-
uated employees in total workforce (HIGHSKILL) and the firms’ expenditure
on training per employee (EDUC_PEMP ). The former controls for firms’ gen-
eral propensity to adopt organizational change while the latter explicitly addresses
technology adopters’ need for skilled workforce as the productivity paradox pre-
dicts. This means that firms that have adopted any kind of technical innovation
need skilled personnel to operate capital that embodies the new technology. Caroli
and Van Reenen (2001) show that organizational change and the skill level of em-
ployees are complementary. The obvious consequence of this finding, of course, is
11
that the level of human capital itself is an important determinant of whether orga-
nizational change within the firm can happen. In other words, they invest in new
human capital that adds to their current stock of human capital10. Likewise, it is
crucial to control for the firms’ general innovative capabilities. As a first measure,
firms research an development expenditures scaled by the number of employees
(R&D_INT ) is considered. However, this measures reflects rather the costs of
R&D and not necessarily its innovation capacity. Hence, we include dummies for
the case that the firm had successfully introduced product (PD_INNO) or pro-
cess innovations (PC_INNO) before. For further robustness checks, the variable
INNOV ATOR takes the value of one if at least one type of innovation (product
and process) was introduced and zero otherwise. As a further measure for tech-
nological advance, the effects from the firms’ stock of technological knowledge is
captured by including the patent stock (PATSTOCK). It was constructed using
the perpetual inventory method, where a yearly depreciation rate of the knowl-
edge stock of 15 per cent was assumed11.
Finally, we control for whether the firm is located in Eastern Germany (EAST_
GER) as structural differences between the West and East German federal states
persist since the reunification.12
Descriptive statistics of the variables and their timing are summarized in Table
A.2 in the Appendix. The results from this bivariate probit model are presented in
Tables 2 and 3 and will be discussed in subsection 4.
IV.B Correlations Between Adoption Decisions
The descriptive analysis of adoption decision frequencies (Table 1) clearly sh-
ow an important point in the analysis of complementarity between discrete firm
strategies. It is clear to see that organizational change jointly adopted with green
technology appears more frequently in our sample than the case that green tech-
nology is adopted only. In other words, the adoption decisions do not seem to
be randomly allocated in the sample which indicates that there is an underlying
correlation among the strategies. This correlation becomes more obvious if we
10This is in line with the literature that predicts technical change and organizational change
complementarity to be skill-biased (Bresnahan et al. 2002). However, Goldin and Katz (1998)
demonstrate that technical change is not necessarily biased towards more skilled labor. The tran-
sition from human-capital or skill-intensive handicraft manufacturing before the industrial revolu-
tion towards factor or assembly-line production was characterized by an increase in the relative
need of skilled labor. In contrast, the transition from factory manufacturing towards more flexi-
ble modern forms of manufacturing appears to be skill-biased. This finding also seems to support
the link between organizational and technical change that is, however, not explicitly touched by
Goldin and Katz (1998).
11Typically scholars have measured the technology knowledge stock of firms by the discounted
sum of prior R&D investments and/or their patent stock (see e.g. Bloom and Van Reenen (2002)).
We use a 15% depreciation rate as suggested by Griliches and Mairesse (1984).
12We distinguish 22 different sectors based on aggregated 2-digit NACE-levels which is the
official classification of economic activities in the European Community. See Table A.1 in the
appendix.
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look at the expected frequency reported in parentheses that reflect the estimated
frequency that would have been observed, had the two adoption decisions been
independent. The expected frequency for adoption of green technology only is
larger than the one for joint adoption. This correlation could be interpreted as
good news for finding complementarity, but needs to be singled out from other
non-random factors determining this correlation.
In order to address this problem of non-randomly assigned adoption decisions,
we will use the two stage procedure as described before where we first estimate
a bivariate discrete choice model that allows for correlation among the adoption
equations. The predicted probabilities for each of the adoption combinations to
appear in the sample are used as instruments in a second stage estimation.
Table 1: Adoption Decision Frequencies and Relative Frequencies
Xor Xor
Xgr 0 1 TOTAL Xgr 0 1 TOTAL
0 1,624 1,094 2,718 0 41.68 % 28.09 % 69.77 %
(1,443.4) (1,274.6) (37.05 %) (32.72 %)
1 445 733 1,178 1 11.42 % 18.81 % 30.23 %
(625.6) (552.4) (16.05 %) (14.18 %)
TOTAL 2,069 1,827 3,896 TOTAL 53.10 % 46.90 % 100.00 %
Expected frequencies appear in parentheses.
Pearson chi2(1) = 159.3419 Pr = 0.000
Kendall’s tau-b = 0.2022, P > z = 0.0000
V. RESULTS
Before discussing the results for the test of complementarity, we first look at
the bivariate discrete response model for firms’ choice of adopting green and or-
ganizational innovations. The predicted probabilities from this model serve as
instruments in the output equation (Wooldridge 2002, p. 623).
V.A Results from the Bivariate Probit Model
The results from the bivariate probit model appear in Table 2. The most rele-
vant information from this table is the correlation among the two equations, which
is significantly positive. Whether this correlation is due to complementarity or just
because of unobserved correlation is unclear at this stage of the analysis as argued
by Miravete and Pernías (2010). The coefficients of the included variables show,
by and large, the expected signs.13 The regulation variable is significantly affecting
13The share of highly qualified personnel, however, has a negative effect on the green innova-
tion, possibly reflecting the capital intensity of firms most introducing such innovations (see also
the positive effect of logged capital on Xgr). Training expenses, on the other hand, have a positive
13
the adoption of green innovations, but also of organizational innovations. If regu-
lations are seen from an exclusion restriction perspective, with no direct effect on
organizational innovations, the positive significant coefficient can be interpreted
as evidence of complementarity, i.e. driven by the higher returns on organizational
innovations when combined with environmental innovations.
We turn to the marginal effects for each combination of the dependent vari-
ables as presented in Table 3. The marginal effects (at means, and for dummies as
discrete changes from 0 to 1) are reported for model specification IV only. While
these results, of course, also do not allow to conclude that complementarity is
present, it offers interesting insights on why a respective choice of innovation
adoption is done by firms. We see from the marginal effects on the likelihood
to introduce GREEN_ONLY is indeed significantly driven by regulatory forces.
However, the effect on introducing BOTH, i.e. also organizational change, is
much larger. Regulation affects significantly negatively the likelihood of adopting
only organizational innovations. The overall positive effect in the bivariate probit
results for organizational innovations therefore come from the combined case. In
line with predictions from the literature on skill-biased organizational change, we
find the share of highly qualified employees to positively affect the realization of
organizational change. Interestingly, training of employees is of even greater im-
portance than their initial skill level. While we find a negative correlation between
HIGHSKILL and the introduction of green innovations, probably due to the
more capital intensive production of firms that have the potential to introduce CO2
emitting technologies, we find a strong positive effect of the firms’ expenditures on
the training of their employees (EDUC_PEMP ) on the joint introduction of both
green innovations and organizational change (Bresnahan et al. 2002). In general,
firms combining green and organizational innovations are typically more endowed
with innovation capacities than firms exclusively introducing green innovations.
effect in both equations. Firm size is positive for both strategies. General innovative capabilities as
measured by the past innovations dummies are positive and highly significant for both forms of in-
novations. As expected, older firms are less likely to change their organizational structures. Firms
in Eastern Germany are less likely to introduce green innovations. The Herfindahl-Index is positive
in the organizational change equation, but insignificant for green innovations. Firms reporting
to face tough competitive pressure are more likely to introduce green innovations. However, no
causal relationship can be claimed at this point. Industry dummies are jointly significant in both
equations capturing effects from different technological environments and industry-level life cycle
effects.
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The measure of sales concentration (HHI) though shows that higher industry
concentration, i.e. weaker competition, reduces the likelihood to innovate green,
but had a positive effect on organizational innovations. The control variables
for capital and labor show the expected signs. More capital intensive firms are
more likely to innovate green and more likely to adopt organizational jointly with
green innovation. Larger firms in terms of employees, on the other hand, are
less likely to innovate green only, but have a larger likelihood of innovating their
organizational structures and to do so jointly with reducing their CO2 emissions.
Older firms are less inclined to change their organizational characteristics and
are also more likely to have introduced neither organizational nor environmental
innovations. Eastern German firms are more likely to change their organization
compared to firms in the Western states, but tend to pure organizational changes
without simultaneously adopting green innovations.
Table 3: Marginal Effects for any Adoption Decision Combination from the Bivari-
ate Probit Estimation, Specification IV only
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NEITHER GREEN ONLY ORGA. ONLY BOTH
REG -0.261*** 0.073*** -0.050*** 0.238***
(0.020) (0.012) (0.017) (0.022)
HIGHSKILL 0.000 -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EDUC_PEMP -0.053*** -0.001 0.025** 0.030***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
log_CAP -0.002 0.007*** -0.009** 0.004**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
log_LAB -0.065*** -0.013*** 0.047*** 0.030***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
log_ENMAT 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003)
R&D_INT 0.440 0.264 -0.584 -0.120
(0.383) (0.395) (0.578) (0.325)
PATSTOCK -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PC_INNO -0.265*** -0.030*** 0.113*** 0.182***
(0.016) (0.010) (0.021) (0.016)
PD_INNO -0.134*** 0.010 0.028 0.096***
(0.022) (0.010) (0.018) (0.0180)
HARDCOMP -0.026* 0.011 -0.006 0.020**
(0.016) (0.008) (0.013) (0.010)
HHI -0.000 <-0.001** <0.001*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
AGE 0.001*** <0.001* -0.001*** <-0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EAST_GER 0.003 -0.026*** 0.039*** -0.016*
(0.015) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008)
Case Probabilities Pr(Xgr =0, Pr(Xgr =1, Pr(Xgr =0, Pr(Xgr =1,
Xor = 0) Xor = 0) Xor = 1) Xor = 1)
0.4071 0.1207 0.3177 0.1545
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, robust standard errors appear in parentheses
Marginal effects of 21 jointly significant sector dummies are omitted from the table.
From the bivariate probit regression, we use the predicted values for the con-
ditional probabilities for any combination of the two innovation variables (See
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bottom of Table 3) as instruments in the output equation. A result worth being
mentioned here is that the case probability for observing the outcome BOTH—
conditioned on several factors and most importantly the covariances of the two
equations’ error terms—is smaller than the one directly observed in the sample
(18.81%). This finding can be interpreted in a way that unobserved correlation
among the adoption decisions has been—at least partly—corrected for by estimat-
ing both equations jointly.
V.B Estimating Productivity Effects of Green Innovation and Organizational Change
For the following step in which we estimate conditional productivity effects of
the adoption decisions, we chose the category “Neither” as the reference category,
so that in the second stage regressions, f(0, 0) is set to zero. After all other factors
have been controlled for, the test for complementarity then reduces to:
f(1, 0) + f(0, 1)− f(1, 1) ≤ 0, or (12)
f(GREEN_ONLY ) + f(ORGA_ONLY )− f(BOTH) ≤ 0, (13)
which means that we are interested in the effect of the innovation adoption deci-
sions on the respective measure for productivity after all other factors determin-
ing productivity have been taken into account. When using the term productivity
we simply mean the difference in produced output given constant inputs of cap-
ital (log_CAP ), labor (log_LAB), and energy and materials (log_MAT ). Since
the innovation adoption decisions are expected to be endogenous, their predicted
values from the bivariate probit model serve as instruments in a two-stage least
squares estimation procedure. The results from the second stage regression are
presented in Table 4 below.
The results indicate that when controlling for factor inputs such as capital,
labor, materials including energy and general innovation capabilities, we find
considerable differences in the productivity effects of the adoption decision for
green and organizational innovations. As expected and as suggested by many
critiques of environmental regulations and policy-induced green innovations, we
find a strong negative effect from carbon dioxide abatement technology adop-
tion if it had been introduced solely (GREEN_ONLY ). Holding all other in-
puts fixed, a firm that has adopted green technology alone faces significant losses
in productivity (-1.484 percent in our preferred model specification IV). Orga-
nizational change (ORGA_ONLY ), however, is associated with significant posi-
tive effects on output holding all inputs fixed. Importantly, however, those firms
that adopted green technologies jointly with organizational change do experi-
ence a productivity increase since they can produce 0.664 percent more out-
put with the same amounts of inputs compared to firms that do neither. The
coefficient of BOTH is positive and statistically significant pointing to a com-
plementary relationship between green innovations and organizational change.
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Table 4: Estimation results of the output equation
IV-REGRESSIONS†
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG(OUTPUT) LOG(OUTPUT) LOG(OUTPUT) LOG(OUTPUT)
I II III IV
log_CAP 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.037***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
log_LAB 0.506*** 0.508*** 0.513*** 0.527***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.026)
log_MAT 0.398*** 0.399*** 0.401*** 0.401***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
GREEN_ONLY -1.766*** -1.740*** -1.309*** -1.482***
(0.539) (0.532) (0.392) (0.431)
ORGA_ONLY 0.975*** 0.954*** 1.219*** 0.759***
(0.287) (0.285) (0.388) (0.263)
BOTH 0.670*** 0.665*** 0.741*** 0.664***
(0.211) (0.209) (0.243) (0.222)
R&D_INT 1.811 1.815 3.168* 2.331
(2.108) (2.084) (1.786) (1.784)
PATSTOCK -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
INNOV ATOR -0.273***
(0.097)
PC_INNO -0.224***
(0.078)
PD_INNO -0.031
(0.045)
HARDCOMP -0.003 -0.010
(0.031) (0.029)
HHI -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
AGE 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
EASTGER -0.274*** -0.273*** -0.273*** -0.259***
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.034)
CONSTANT -0.510*** -0.514*** -0.521*** -0.547***
(0.155) (0.154) (0.134) (0.131)
R2 0.763 0.768 0.784 0.813
Root MSE 0.960 0.949 0.918 0.852
Observations 3,896 3,896 3,896 3,896
One-sided test against H0: GREEN_ONLY + ORGA_ONLY - BOTH ≥ 0
P-Value 0.020 0.010 0.025 0.002
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, robust standard errors appear in parentheses
† The variables GREEN_ONLY , ORGA_ONLY , and BOTH are instrumented using the predicted probabilities
from the respective bivariate probit model specifications. The models include 21 jointly significant sector dummies
based on aggregated NACE 2-digit levels.
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However, as mentioned earlier to say that complementarity is present requires
to test for validity of the condition of supermodularity stated in the inequality
12. Table 4 therefore provides results for a one-sided test against the null that
GREEN_ONLY + ORGA_ONLY − BOTH ≥ 0 which ought to be rejected if
complementarity is present. As said, NEITHER is linearly dependent and serves
as the reference category. The test statistics prsented at the bottom of Table 4
provide significant evidence for complementarity of green and organizational in-
novations in all model specifications.
V.C Quality of the Constructed Instruments
In the output regression presented above, the key independent variables are
endogenous and instrumented using their predicted values from a bivariate profit
estimation. If, however, these instruments are weak in the sense that they are
only weakly correlated with the endogenous variables, the estimates of the com-
plementary variables may be seriously biased. For this reason, we test the validity
of these instruments.
Due to the use of three predicted values from the bivariate profit as instruments
for the three innovation adoption decisions (the fourth one is linearly dependent),
the model is by construction just identified. Moreover, with three endogenous
variables and three instruments, it is not possible to obtain critical values for the
two weak-identification tests suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005). We therefore
stick to the rule of thumb offered by Staiger and Stock (1997). This rule is to
look on the first stage F-statistics of joint significance of the instruments. A F-value
of 10 or higher suggests the validity of the instruments. For all estimated model
specifications, the first stage F-statistics are provided below in Table 5 and indicate
non-weakness of the instruments.
Table 5: First Stage F-Statistics for the Excluded Instruments
FIRST STAGE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS
F-STATISTICS 1 2 3 4
GREEN_ONLY 15.4009 15.4876 20.4808 19.0512
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ORGA_ONLY 26.8120 26.5090 27.4216 31.6028
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
BOTH 83.0185 82.7292 77.3350 66.9240
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
P-values for the F-test against the null that the instruments are not jointly statistically different
from zero appear in parentheses.
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The motivation for the presented analysis was drawn from two fields of re-
search. First, the literature on within-firm organizational change and productivity
suggests that firms can make more efficient use of certain technologies if comple-
mentary forms of organization are adopted. These cross-effects between technol-
ogy and organizational structure may be crucial to explaining the “productivity
paradox” related to the lacking productivity effects following the introduction of
new technologies. Second, this aspect may be of even greater importance for the
case of greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement technologies that are imposed by public
authority and have the aim to reduce social costs of climate change. The private
returns to the introduction of such technologies are apparently less obvious or can
even expected to be negative. Previous research, however, had largely neglected
the relationship between green technologies and organizational change. Our anal-
ysis of German firm-level data shows that indeed organizational change increases
the returns to the use of CO2 reducing technologies which results in positive ef-
fects on productivity. Without having introduced adequate organizational infras-
tructure, such technology is associated with significantly lower productivity. The
results from our two-stage estimation procedure thus suggest that the introduction
of green technologies and organizational innovations are complementary. In other
words, firms that adopted green technologies jointly with changes to their organi-
zational structure can make better use of green technologies and hence more than
offset productivity losses compared to firms having only adopted green technology.
A conclusion our results do not allow is that green technology adoption per se
is beneficial to a firm if it also introduces the right organizational structure. Or
in other words, our results do not allow to conclude that environmental policy
should implement more stringent regulations as to promote technology adoption
that, in the end, increases productivity if firms implement the right organizational
structure. Such a naive view would neglect the possibility that a firm could have
had adopted an even more productivity increasing technology, had there been no
regulatory pressure to adopt green technology due to budget constraints. Such a
crowding out effect is for instance documented in Gray and Shadbegian (1998).
Future research may address these concerns in the debate of productivity or com-
petitiveness effects of green technology.
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